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The Dickinson School of Law NAFTA
Symposium - The North American Free
Trade Agreement: Engaged To Be
Engaged?
John A. Maher*
I compliment The Dickinson Journal of International Law and
The Dickinson International Law Society for luring sophisticates to
address you concerning The North American Free Trade Agree-
ment. As for me, a decided non-sophisticate, I fear that NAFTA is
being simultaneously oversold and undersold.
The brochure announcing the program referred to formation of
the World's largest common market. There are several snares, psy-
chological and linguistic, implicit in the term "common market."
I don't refer to the obvious fact that it ignores the People's Re-
public of China. Rather I refer first to the fact that the idiom of
some graybeards - such as the speaker - tends to use the term
"common market" to refer to the European Community. Those of us
who followed working groups that led up to signature of the 1958
Treaty of Rome fell long ago into the habit of short-handing the
then EEC as "the common market." This, of course, incorrectly ig-
nored other similar phenomena such as the earlier BeNeLux and the
later LAFTA. Be patient with greybeards as we labor to improve our
idiom. I confess the early EEC and later EC never claimed and
couldn't claim exclusive rights to "common market" and I promise
to endeavor to use the term only generically.
However, there is a tendency, in American propaganda attend-
ing agreement in principle upon NAFTA, to compare - sub silentio
- NAFTA with EC. Otherwise, there is no point to trumpeting the
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fact that the three initial NAFTA nations embrace 360 million resi-
dent consumers. "Economics of scale" doesn't say it all. NAFTA is,
or should be, for small businesses as well as large. Obviously, the
comparison is with the EC 12's 340 million. We must not be be-
guiled by the contrast. Use of the term "common market" to suggest
equivalency of EC and NAFTA is deceptive. EC differs dramatically
from the embryonic NAFTA and an embryonic EC differed from
NAFTA.
I do not refer to the fact that EC is a "customs union" whereas
NAFTA would establish a free trade area. I do not refer to the num-
bers game when, tomorrow or the day after, Austria and some other
EFTA nations will effectively join the Club.
Rather, I point to the fact that the Treaty of Rome itself con-
templated creation of what amounted to an Executive - for that is
what is implicit in the Commission and in the evolved post held by
M. Delors. The Rome Treaty dealt with various issues in very partic-
ularized and sometimes specific terms. It was aimed at developing
more efficient industrial engines rather than merely minimizing offi-
cial tariff and non-tariff barriers. Witness, for example, articles 85,
86 and 87 of the Rome Treaty as they not only established a trans-
national philosophic approach to anti-cartelism (or, in the U.S. us-
age, antitrust) but particularized substantive rules of decision for
anti-cartel prosecutions and a mechanism for executive dispensations
from the rules. Witness the Rome Treaty's provision of affirmative
defenses, sounding in anti-cartelism, to antidumping complaints.
Witness the EC Commission's calculated avoidance of emulating the
U.S.A.'s Parker v. Brown trap. That, in effect, invites states to frus-
trate national competition policy. There is no potency for, say, Italy
to immunize private merchants from article 85 whereas there is
every potency for California to mandate conduct ordinarily offensive
to the Sherman Antitrust Act.
What of NAFTA and anti-cartelism? It speaks to good will and
to coordination.
Lest we fall prey to the easy comparisons with EC, I think it
useful to look eastward. It is said that the Single Market Program of
the European Community is the most significant economic and polit-
ical event to occur in Europe in the second half of the twentieth
century. The Program is affecting the way business is done world-
wide, whether or not a given enterprise does business within EC.
Someday, this may be true of NAFTA but mark you well that there
is no proposal for a transnational NAFTA Executive; no proposal for
a transnational bureaucracy; no proposal for a transnational parlia-
ment of even the weak EC variety.
What I see in NAFTA is something about which first year stu-
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dents are warned: a whole series of promises to promise, given color
and substance by provisions necessitating repeated visits to three
parliaments - and subsequent administrative elaborations - in a
context in which one nation's constitution seemingly provides against
entrepreneurs of the other two nations becoming involved in mineral
exploitation or railway management. EC has taken great strides to-
ward being a single marketplace dedicated to fair competition but, at
this juncture, NAFTA has no such pretension. It looks to minimiz-
ing tariff and non-tariff barriers, to protecting intellectual property
but it does not say "let free market forces play."
A principal root of today's EC is a customs union arrived at in
the 1958 Treaty of Rome. Other roots were the BeNeLux combina-
tion, the Coal & Steel Community and EurAtom. The Treaty of
Rome looked to creating a "common market" by eliminating various
factors that distorted competition. Implicit in the Treaty was crea-
tion of the EC Commission destined to serve not only as administra-
tive heart of the market but as regulator in terms of generating and
enforcing various rules such as those implementing the anti-cartel
theme. Before and after 1986 signature of the Single European Act,
there has been significant evolution toward a harmonization of vari-
ous of the member nations' procedural and substantive rules in par-
ticulars intended in order to accommodate not only marketing of
goods and services within the community but also easing financial
transactions. Quite apart from strides to harmonize "company laws"
and capital flow regulation, there has been considerable progress in
eliminating non-tariff barriers by standardizing technical controls in
terms of chemicals, food stuffs, pharmaceuticals, etc. [This has been
aided by several non-governmental organizations (NGOs) including
the European Committee for Stabilization (CEN), Committee for
Electro-Technical Standardization (CENELEC) and the TeleCom-
munications Standards Institute (ETSI).] EC has gone further and
is going further. Quite ignoring the troubled ECU medium of inter-
national settlements and the on-again, off-again progress toward a
common currency, EC has done and will do many other things well
beyond constituting a mere customs union cum free trade zone.
EC even affects the way corporate lawyers - and not just those
resident in Europe - think. Thus, EC has developed what some call
a new form of business entity - an intra- community partnership of
at least two persons residing in at least two member states which is
regarded as an entity for purposes of contracting. This entity, the
European Economic Interest Grouping (EEIG) is not all that unfa-
miliar conceptually to common lawyers of Canada, the UK and the
U.S.A. Those of you who have studied Enterprise Organization
might well conclude that EEIG is nothing more nor less than the
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association contemplated by section 6 of the Uniform Partnership
Act but for demands that at least two "partners" must be residents
of two differing EC nations and that certain filings are needful. In a
similar vain, practitioners will be affected by the fact that EC is de-
veloping a community-wide corporation law.
Students of American Constitutional history easily can associate
the themes underlying the Treaty of Rome and subsequent events
with themes at play during the Annapolis and Philadelphia conven-
tions that led the Constitution of the United States of America as
originally adopted.
Look to the invitations to the Annapolis and Philadelphia con-
ventions. Compare them with the expressions of Schuman, DeGas-
pari, Spaak and Adenauer.
Some but not all of these themes are involved in the NAFTA
initiative.
The key to NAFTA is somewhat free trade among the North
American nations - and such other nations as wish to join but are
not black-balled by a member. Implicit in this is discrimination
against non-members.
Yet, from the perspective of a citizen of the United States, there
is no sense that NAFTA must succeed lest we three nations fall prey
to avaricious sovereigns of other continents. There is no theme to the
effect that we three nations must eliminate potencies for perpetua-
tion of something akin to the more or less constant continental war-
fare that had few protracted respites from the time of the break up
of the Roman Empire through 1945.
Those who conceived of the Treaty of Rome were primarily citi-
zens of continental survivors of almost two millennia of warfare. The
U.K., not fully involved in all of the wars of all of those years, did
not join EC for many a year.
Think, what is this NAFTA? I like to think of it as a common
sense arrangement among three nations having common geo-political
concerns all too rarely addressed in a collective fashion.
We three nations share a continent permitting easy land
transportation.
We three nations have easy water transport to Asia and Europe.
We three nations are parts of both the Pacific Rim phenomenon
and of classic Atlantic trade patterns.
We three nations have atmospheric pools and water resources in
common.
We three nations have not always lived in peace but we have
not been involved in constant warfare. It is something like 130 years
since the United States arguably tolerated, and then contained, the
Fenian invasion of Upper Canada thereby giving impetus to the Brit-
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ish North America Act. It is just shy of 80 years since American
forces occupied Vera Cruz. Monuments, in Mexican cities, to the
Vera Cruz casualties are still fresh as are the flowers gracing monu-
ments in smaller cities. Yet, I am happy to report, there also is a
memory among educated folk in Mexico of a U.S.A. president sym-
pathetic to liberation of Mexico from a yoke only symbolized by
Maximillian.
Our three nations have not had parallel developments. Mexico
has a formal constitutional system not dramatically unlike the
U.S.A. but what of P.R.I. domination of Mexico's central
government?
I think it difficult to avoid the fact that much of Canada and
the United States of America fully share a common culture. The
same is not true of Mexico and the U.S.A., whether or not one fo-
cuses on the P.R.I. or Mexico's long standing love-hate relationship
with the Roman Catholic Church. American and Canadian similari-
ties, except in forms of government and conduct of courts, are such
that one wonders whether or not there has become one Canadian-
American nation (less, only possibly, Quebec) with some sixty-odd
centers of power. Most assuredly, the North American Association
of Securities Administrators (NAASA), in which the Canadian
Provinces and territories as well as the states and D.C. fully partici-
pate, gives mute testimony. I hasten to say Mexico is a NAASA
member.
The border between the U.S.A. and Mexico, once a line
wrought variously by negotiation and warfare, is no longer sharply
defined except on maps. Much of it is lost in a vaguely recognized
zone. Oh, it is easy enough to mark the borders between San Diego
and Tiajuana, the two Nogales, Ciudad Juarez and El Paso, Mata-
moros and Brownsville but are those municipally-centered borders
any more significant than the one between Detroit and Windsor? If
they are, what then of the proposition that five-sixths of the length of
the 2,000 mile Mexican-American border is scrub desert through the
roughest parts of which some folk wander nonchalantly from one
side of an only presumed line to the other? Does this porosity differ
from much of the U.S.A.-Canada border?
Not at all. What difference there is lies in the compulsion for
some Mexicans to seek out the higher wages of Canada and the
U.S.A. while, currently, some Canadian enterprises move to the
U.S.A.
Pundits say that Mexico is elated with NAFTA, Canada is de-
spondent about NAFTA and the U.S.A. is confused about it. Some
Americans project the near-term export of many jobs to Mexico at
no cost to it. Other Americans say that the inevitable long-term ef-
NAFTA
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fect will be to increase Mexican wage rates and thereby lessen pres-
sure for emigration. Both may be correct. But, it is folly to say there
is no cost to Mexico.
What of the 500,000 Mexicans now employed by 1700 maqui-
ladoras along the border? Those maquiladoras bring in nearly a
third of Mexico's foreign-exchange earnings. Why do they exist?
Well, purely and simply, wages for comparable functions in Mexico
run something like forty percent of those in the U.S.A. and it just
makes good sense for many U.S. companies to put labor intensive
operations on one side of the border and capital intensive operations
on the other, paying U.S. import duty on only value added. And, this
is just what has happened. All sorts of those 1700 maquiladoras have
complementary U.S.A.-based functions - warehousing operations
and operations involving very expensive labor-saving tools - just
miles away north of the border. Indeed, this is almost a common
arrangement. Won't those 500,000 jobs be put up for grabs by
NAFTA? Of course they will, at great political risk to the P.R.I.,
Mexico's ruling party.
I do not suggest that a free market will ignore specialization of
functions in the long term.
I merely suggest, in a fairly near term, that there will no longer
be much magic for U.S. firms in locating "just across the border" for
which reason we can anticipate that, when NAFTA is broadly effec-
tive to the extent that U.S. operators see virtues in locating in Mexi-
can regions much further south of the border, they will do so. When
this happens, Mexico will experience problems involving dislocation
of workers south from the border. So, Mexico too will pay a price
sounding in social discontent just as Canada has paid a price as vari-
ous of its smaller but effective companies have relocated to the
U.S.A.
I am long overdue in reaching one of my assignments: an over-
view of NAFTA less its labor and diplomatically ground-breaking
environmental aspects. They will be covered by our friends from
Washington.
It is a given that Canada and Mexico are our first and third
largest trading partners. It also is a given that we and Canada have
been members of GATT (that is, the General Agreement on Trade
and Tariffs) for many years whereas Mexico is a fairly recent adher-
ent to GATT.
Mexico spends seventy percent of its import dollars on U.S.
goods. In this context, Mexico has surpassed Japan as our second
largest market for manufactured goods. The U.S. Department of
Commerce insists that exports to Mexico support approximately
600,000 jobs within the United States.
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I think it fair to say that President Salinas has turned Mexico
away from across-the-board protectionist attitudes and all but for-
mal allegiance to centralized national state planning. Tonight is not
the occasion to debate the whyness of Mexico's turn from its Import
Substitution Industrialization program.
We, as citizens of the United States, must be more sensitive to
the fact that many folk in Ontario and in Mexico think that we are a
colossus so focused on Europe and Asia that we are cavalier about
our closest neighbors. It goes without saying that we, as citizens of
the United States; must respect the fact that the Mexican Constitu-
tion provides against foreign domination of certain natural and man-
made resources. More than that, we must understand why that
came to pass. But Mexican sophisticates must understand that,
before a truly common market can eventuate, there must be a transi-
tion from insulating Mexican mineral exploitation. How can we long
have a market in which Mexican capital can derive nourishment
from mineral exploitation in Canada and the U.S.A. without
reciprocity?
Note that NAFTA started in a bilateral negotiation between
Presidents Bush and Salinas. They gracefully acceded to Prime Min-
ister Mulroney's request that Canada be included. Were I Prime
Minister Mulroney, I would have made the very same request.
Purely and simply, Canada could not afford to be absent from a bar-
gaining table at which the advantages implicit in the 1989 CFTA
(Canadian Free Trade Agreement) could be prejudiced. It is sad to
see that Mulroney's vision is part-and-parcel of his downfall as some
Canadians attribute all short-term economic woes to CFTA and pro-
ject worse from NAFTA.
It is time to speak to what are the key provisions of NAFTA
excluding, of course, labor and environmental issues.
I. Tariffs
Looking to tariffs, all tariffs among the three nations are to be
dropped pursuant to several different time tables understandably re-
lating to varying sensitivities in the three nations. About half of all
Mexican tariffs will be eliminated immediately upon effective date of
the agreement, currently targeted at January 1, 1994 but definitely
put at risk by unsurprising lobbying in the U.S.A. Stateside critics of
NAFTA tend to ignore this. Almost all other tariffs will be elimi-
nated in five to ten years, with equal annual reductions being the
norm. Tariffs on some highly sensitive products (e.g., corn, beans
and raw sugar) will be phased out across fifteen years.
CFTA included similar arrangements but there is a great differ-
ence. The current level of Mexico's tariffs are, generally speaking,
NAFTA
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more than two-and-one-half times the U.S. tariff rates for which rea-
son elimination of Mexican tariffs will be a definite boon to U.S.
exporters.
II. Rules of Origin
Looking to rules of origin so important to free trade zones large
and small, it is easy to say that NAFTA provides that preferential
tariff treatments will be available to goods if their labor and materi-
als content is predominantly from the U.S.A., Canada and Mexico.
What if there are components from other nations? Generally speak-
ing, the magic line will be sixty or sixty-five percent of transaction
value, or fifty percent of net cost, but such value lines are not the
exclusive criteria. Happily, NAFTA article 465 provides a de
minimis provision absent from CFTA. But, as the short experience
with Canada demonstrates, rules of origin are very tricky indeed.
One need only to look at the annex to NAFTA to appreciate how
much paper has been and will be devoted to rules of origin ab initio.
Thus, Annex 401.1, amplifying a fifty-two-word article 401(b), is
166 pages!
Much more paper is to come.
III. Customs Administration
Customs administration will be simplified - we hope.
That was one of the objectives with our Canadian agreement
but it led to an unlovely scenario in which the Canadian customs
people have one set of rules for - let's say - rules of origin and the
U.S. customs people have quite another. Each set purports to be im-
plementing the CFTA.
IV. Technical Standards
In NAFTA, the high contracting parties affirm their GATT
commitments not to use technical standards for goods (including
sanitary/physical standards for animal, plant and other ingestible
products) as disguised non-tariff restrictions on trade. The parties
also have agreed to work toward compatibility of federally developed
standards related to safety, health, environmental and consumer pro-
tection. Beware that word "federally."
Each nation promises to provide both national treatment and
most-favored-nation treatment with respect to standards- related
measures but each nation is free to choose the level of protection it
deems appropriate.
Rather than mandate any particular substantive standards,
these sections of NAFTA are primarily concerned with procedural
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guarantees. As Mr. Mickey Kantor apparently has failed to note,
each of us has promised to have a transparent or open system for
establishing standards with advance public notice, opportunity to
comment, publication of final standards and central information
points.
Were I a Mexican entrepreneur, I'd worry about the recently
reasserted role of the States of the U.S.A. in food and drug regula-
tion. California's Proposition 65 can spread to other products and to
other States. I say the same thing of Sonora & Chihuahua, Alberta
& Sask.
Looking to government procurement, always a sore thumb,
NAFTA covers procurements of a specified dollar value thresholds
by specified federal-level departments and agencies as well as by cer-
tain federally-owned enterprises.
NAFTA does not guarantee that particular government con-
tracts or procurements will be awarded to NAFTA bidders but it
does aim to provide procedural safeguards. As in the standards area,
each nation promises national treatment or most favored nation
treatment to NAFTA enterprises. Each of us have agreed to have
an open and competitive bidding process with a bid protest system
that allows suppliers to challenge awards and procedures. Again,
what of the States and Provinces?
V. Intellectual Property
Interestingly, NAFTA has gone beyond CFTA in that there is
explicit provision for intellectual property rights. Our Canadian
brethren are not too pleased by this. U.S. technology companies are
delighted. They have regarded Mexico as a haven for folks not too
respectful of proprietary rights in ethical drugs and other items of
commerce. NAFTA provides specific standards for protection for
patents, copyrights, trademarks and trade secrets that exceed those
in most existing bi-lateral and multilateral agreements to which the
U.S.A. is party. NAFTA contemplates a generation of detailed pro-
visions governing intellectual property enforcement both internally
and at the border. But, what of access to Mexican courts to imple-
ment the NAFTA aspirations? Are the "rights" worth much without
an assured private cause of action?
We can recall that, in the original analysis, GATT was uncon-
cerned with services.
The NAFTA nations agree to provide national or most favored
nation treatment to each others' service providers with certain excep-
tions implicit in constitutional restraints or very strong public senti-
ments. Thus, while we must recognize that President Salinas has
overseen the privatization of various Mexican organizations such as
NAFTA
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airlines and telephone service, we also must recognize the ordinary
Mexican's sensitivity concerning railways.
VI. Specific Services
Interestingly, the nations have made a number of commitments
concerning specific service industries. This includes the right of li-
censed attorneys to practice as "foreign legal consultants."
In financial services, the agreement will open the banking secur-
ities and insurance sectors in Mexico to U.S. investment after a ten-
year transition period.
To the degree that exceptions are allowed, transparent regula-
tions are evoked.
What are the exclusions? Well, the U.S.A. regards intra- na-
tional maritime services as peculiarly sensitive. The Jones Act lives,
presumably courtesy of the steel industry and unions or a "reserve
fleet" strategy or, more likely, the latter fronting for the former. Ca-
nada considers its social services and cultural industries are sensitive.
Mexico's Constitutional sensitivities run to mineral and rail trans-
port as well as to the mineral exploitation alluded to earlier.
VII. Investment
Looking to investment, NAFTA promises the better of national
or most favored nations treatment as well as no restrictions on trans-
fer or repatriation of profits or capital paybacks.
NAFTA goes beyond CFTA in offering investors the option of
taking money damage disputes with the host government to an inter-
national arbitral panel. As with the services section, the investment
chapter is subject to various reservations and exceptions based on
existing laws and sensitive sectors.
VIII. Disputes (General)
Looking to dispute settlement generally, disputes under
NAFTA (except investor v. state disputes) are to be handled in a
manner similar to that contemplated by CFTA. There is a combina-
tion of government-to-government consultation mechanisms and ar-
bitration-type panels with special procedures evoked for anti-dump-
ing and countervailing duty cases. In addition, the NAFTA nations
promise to enforce commercial arbitral agreements and awards as
well as to establish an advisory committee to encourage the use of
alternative dispute settlement mechanisms for commercial disputes.
Will bureaucrats react in real time?
NAFTA contemplates that there will be a commission or sev-
eral commissions to resolve various issues and to assist in the evolu-
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tion of the relationship. However, I see no evidence that there will
be a strong executive.
IX. Anti-competitive Practices
Similarly, in terms of vigorous prosecution of allegedly anti-
competitive practices, I see no great promise.
To be sure, there are provisions which indicate that the nations
will chat and collaborate but, in reality, there is no assurance that
U.S. citizens will have much relief in Mexican courts if PEMEX
throws its weight around in Mexico. Canada, of course, had an anti-
trust law before the U.S.A. and there is an anti-combines bureau
that has a formal liaison with the U.S. Antitrust Division. Others are
more qualified to remark on Mexico's new anti-cartelism statute and
Competition Commission. There is a practice yet to be implemented.
The explicit difference between "absolute" and "relative" monopolis-
tic practices is praiseworthy. But, let it be said that one must doubt
that the new Commission will be unconscious of P.R.I. imperatives.
What, then, if a U.S. or Canadian nails PEMEX in a Canadian
or U.S. court? Remember, it is a U.S. conceit that our Sherman Act
runs "overseas" and only considerations of comity dampen rigorous
justice in U.S. courts. Assuming that nothing more is done, will
NAFTA's expressions sympathetic to fair competition relieve U.S.
courts of their concern for comity vis-a-vis Mexico?
X. Summary
I think it inescapable that we have naught but an agreement to
agree. I have not spoken to specialized labor and environmental ne-
gotiations. If there is to be a NAFTA, whether or not a truly free
market immediately eventuates, leadership is indispensable but not
now all that obvious.
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